

SECRET/EXDIS

SALT TWO  
SESSION I  
A- 96

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
U.S. SALT DELEGATION  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DATE: December 14, 1972

TIME: 1900 - 1910 Hours

PLACE: Soviet Mission

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

Dr. Lawrence D. Weiler

Mr. O. A. Grinevsky

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Evaluation of SALT TWO/I

During a brief conversation at the Soviet reception Grinevsky lamented what he called the clear fact that the U.S. had not come to this session as prepared for negotiations as the Soviet side. He said that in reviewing this session he had concluded there was no point in having held the session. I noted that the U.S. side regarded this brief session as exploratory in nature and thought the Soviets had the same view. I remarked that most statements made by the Soviet side could not, in my opinion, be regarded as indicative of a Soviet desire to start serious negotiations at this time. I said they should review U.S. statements as food for thought in preparing for future negotiations, since the considerations set forth in them reflected serious views of one party in the negotiations that would have to be met if ultimate agreement was to be achieved.

Grinevsky replied that there was a difference between not wishing to make detailed specific proposals, which he understood the U.S. had not planned to do at this session, and not being prepared to have a detailed discussion of the issues. He said the Soviet side had been prepared to enter into such a detailed discussion but had found the U.S. side unprepared for such an exchange.

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Qualitative Limitations

When I commented that his statement about Soviet readiness to have detailed discussions did not jibe with their failure so far to speak of the issues relating to ICBM and SLBM limitations, Grinevsky replied that the Soviet Delegation had raised the important issues concerning missile limitations, more important he said than those raised by the U.S. side. He said that he was referring in particular to the statements made by Shchukin regarding qualitative limitations involving MIRVs. He said the Soviets had taken the initiative in raising the subject and that the U.S. response had amounted to almost nothing. I recalled that Dr. Brown had indicated that qualitative limitations were open for discussion during the course of our negotiations and had said we would be interested in hearing any further Soviet views on the subject.

Grinevsky's reply was that the U.S. response had indicated the U.S. Delegation was not prepared to talk about MIRVs at this time. He said the Soviet Delegation had been prepared to discuss the matter further. I replied if that were the case they should respond to Dr. Brown's invitation to the Soviet Delegation to submit further views. Grinevsky shook his head but then added that he believed there were ways to limit MIRVs but the U.S. should not think it could balance its having MIRVs for the Soviets' having other advantages, for if the U.S. has MIRVs the Soviets will test and have MIRVs. This part of the conversation ended with my saying Dr. Brown's invitation was still on the table and Grinevsky shrugging his shoulders.

Work Program

Grinevsky said the work program exercise had been a waste of time for both delegations. He said he couldn't understand why the U.S. Delegation, after the experience we had had in the past with work programs, had insisted that we go through the same lengthy process of reducing specific items to more general items. He said it only caused trouble for both sides.

*LDW*  
LDWeiler:bls  
December 16, 1972

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